Raising awareness about the 2038 bug in all its manifestations and trying to fix things while there's still time.
On 2038-01-19 03:14:08 UTC, systems that still rely on the ubiquitous 32-bit signed Unix timestamp (time_t) may experience incorrect time calculations, mis-ordered events, crashes, or other failures — unless remediated or architected to tolerate rollover.
Attackers don’t need to wait. Weaknesses in time synchronization mechanisms and time-dependent logic can be exploited today by inducing or amplifying time anomalies.
This is not science fiction. It is a real engineering and security risk affecting systems we rely on daily — from industrial automation and telecom infrastructure to embedded devices and long-lived operational technology.
Time is a shared dependency — the coordination backplane of our digital world. When timestamps become incorrect, or when systems disagree about time, failures can be hard to predict and even harder to diagnose.
Potential impacts include:
Not every system will fail on the rollover moment. Not every failure will be catastrophic. But the risk is real, widespread, and concentrated where patching and replacement cycles are slow.
Many systems represent time using a 32-bit signed integer counting seconds since 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z (“Unix time”). When this counter overflows, affected systems may interpret subsequent timestamps as dates in 1901.
| Event | Timestamp |
|---|---|
| Rollover moment | 2038-01-19 03:14:08 UTC |
| Post-rollover interpretation | 1901-12-13 20:45:52 UTC |
This is the Year 2038 problem (Y2038 / Y2K38).
Where it shows up:
The core risk pattern: time representation limits + long-lived deployment + slow remediation.
Many systems treat time as a trust input. If an attacker can influence a device’s clock, they may trigger time-dependent failures early:
This doesn’t mean attackers can magically flip every system into 2038 behavior. It means time integrity is a security boundary, and insecure time synchronization turns timekeeping bugs into operational security issues.
Y2038 is not the only time-related rollover in this critical two-year window:
| Event | Date |
|---|---|
| NTP Era rollover | 07 February 2036 |
32-bit time_t rollover |
19 January 2038 |
| GPS week number rollover | 20 November 2038 |
These events affect different technologies, but often intersect operationally in real systems. The common thread: time assumptions that were safe when systems were young become dangerous when systems live for decades.
The challenges compound:
Even where fixes exist, remediation takes time: sufficient talent pool, inventory, testing, vendor engagement, change windows, operational risk management. This is a coordination problem as much as a technical one.
The Epochalypse Project is a collaborative effort to:
We aim to be practical: focus on what can be tested, measured, documented, and improved today.
The project was founded by Trey Darley and Pedro Umbelino, security researchers with backgrounds spanning vulnerability research, incident response, and long-lived digital infrastructure.
This is a volunteer-driven effort to help the community coordinate earlier, test more safely, and reduce surprise as these rollovers approach.
Time testing can cause real disruption if done carelessly.
If you’re unsure whether a test could affect others, don’t run it — ask first.
You can help without touching sensitive systems:
Join us: FIRST Time Security SIG
If you operate or build systems with long lifetimes:
We’re building a shared map of risk patterns, testing methods, and mitigation paths — so fewer organizations discover these problems too late and alone.
If you can help test safely, document behaviors, or improve guidance, you’re welcome here.
Let’s reduce catastrophic surprise — together. 🕊️
Epistemic note: This page reflects current understanding as of the date below. Specific behaviors vary by system, implementation, and deployment context.
Page Last Updated: 2026-01-29